

# A VINDICATION of the REMARKS upon Mr. Cha. Leslie's First Dialogue on the Soci- nian Controversy. K

S I R,

I Shall hasten over your Preamble, in which you represent me for a *Socinian*, as if every one, who has not so good an Opinion of the Truth of Contradictions as you have, must needs be such; and also your feigning me to be in a *Passion*, for only censuring your weak Arguments, that you might poorly infer thence, I was a *Lofer by my Talking*; while a whole Torrent of personal Reflections on the Dead, by whole mouthfuls of Reproach, viz. that *pragmatical Hereick, ignorant Pedant Biddle, Dial. 2. pag. 60.* witnesses the Candor and Tenderness of your meek, inoffensive Spirit: All this I wave as little to the purpose, and proceed upon the Argument.

I perceive, by your Answer to the Remarks, that you are resolv'd to found your Scheme of a Trinity on *Mystery and Ignorance*, and to cover your self from the *Unitarians* by impenetrable Darkeness, which you make your Defence. You seem to admit, that as far as human Reason can judg, there are irreconcilable Contradictions in your Scheme of Faith: and therefore, in order to support your Notions, you endeavor to support the Credit of plain Contradictions; intimating, That we conceive of God no otherwise than as a blind Man of Sight, i. e. with a Mind full of Contradictions. To this end

You asserted, that what is a Contradiction in one Nature, may be none in another. I affirm the contrary, that a Contradiction, consisting of two repugnant Propositions, is ever the same, apply it to what Nature you will; because the same thing cannot both

be, and not be at once, whether it be said of God or Man.

You attempted to prove your Paradox by the Motion of the Thoughts to *Rome*, &c. and of the Eyes to the Stars as soon as to the Chimney-Top; which, you say, implies the going two Yards as soon as one; which is a Contradiction in walking, you grant, but not in the Motion of Thoughts and Eyes. Now tho I had shown, that there was really no such Motion in the Thoughts or Eyes, and you seem to be asham'd of it, and therefore shift off one Part on your Man without Thought, which is a contradictory Supposition (which it was time for you to quit, pag. 2. and therefore I shall not expose you on it) and another upon some poor blind Man, that your self might not bear the shame of such Folly; yet you are again trumping up your old Instances, and argue from 'em as if they were true; especially from the Motion of Sight, and the Impossibility of a Born-Blind Man's Conception of Sight, any otherwise than by allowing the aforesaid Contradiction (as 'tis in the Motion of the Legs) to take place here in the Eyes. You ask, p. 2. *How can you explain to him, how the Eye can reach a Star as soon as the Chimney? He feels his Eye with his Hand that 'tis fix'd in his Head; how then can he imagine it gets a thousand Miles off, while he feels it does not stir?* Did ever any Man trifle worse! I tell you, and you seem to admit it, that there is no such thing as the Eyes moving a thousand miles; and yet you suppose your blind Man must be falsely told, and must believe it. I don't wonder if the

poor abus'd Man conceive that to be a flat *Contradiction*, which in Truth is so even to a seeing Man, and which he ought not to believe. But does this prove that 'tis no *Contradiction* to move a *thousand Yards* as soon as one, because you falsly told him, and he foolishly believ'd you, that your Eyes did move so, when they never cou'd do it, because 'tis a *Contradiction*? I thought you were to prove a real *Contradiction* in one Case to be none in another; and now you suppose a *Contradiction* which is not, and conclude from it as if it truly were. So that

This is in effect your Argument; Supposing the Eyes did move to the Stars as soon as to the Chimny, or your Thoughts to *Rome* in an instant (as they do not) then here wou'd be an Instance of that being a *Contradiction* in one Case, *viz.* in *Legs*, which is none in another, *viz.* *Eyes*: but tho there be no such thing in the Premises, yet the Conclusion is true, because it wou'd have been true, if the Premises had been so. No doubt, Sir, you argue very desperately! How does this prove, a *Contradiction* in one Case may be none in another?

But, say you, 'Tis impossible to explain to him what Sight is, so as to reconcile it from being a *Contradiction* to him. I answer, that a true and just Explication of it will not contain any real *Contradiction* in it: and if to him it appears a *Contradiction*, 'tis from his Mistake alone; and you are not to shew that a seeming *Contradiction* may be none (for who doubts that?) but that a real *Contradiction* may, in some Cases, be none. And I pray what *Contradiction* will appear to him, according to what was said, *That the Eye moves not up, but the Star strikes on the Eye*? To this you say, *The blind Man does not feel this*, p. 2. nor knows what you mean by it, or by Seeing. But is this any *Contradiction* to him, that he shou'd not feel every *subtile Particle* that touches on him? or that he shou'd have no Idea of Sight? You add, *He can't think of any other way, but that the Eye must get up to the Star, or the Star come down to the Eye*. I expected he cou'd only imagine his Eye went up to the Star, as you had suggested before, to represent the *Contradiction* of moving so far in an instant; and now you allow him another Conception of Sight, *viz.* *That the Star may extend*

to his Eye. But this is quite another Matter from your Instance of the Eyes going up so many thousand Miles, and has no such Appearance of a *Contradiction*. Nor will it serve your Turn for an Example of a *Contradiction's becoming no Contradiction*: So that, it seems, he may be convinc'd another way, than by persuading him, that what is a *Contradiction* in one Nature is none in another, which you say is the only way, and I that 'tis no way at all; and if he be to be convinc'd this way, he must be suppos'd to have a worse blemish than want of Eye-sight.

The most you can reasonably pretend to here, is, That I can't by my Words help him to form a just Idea of Sight (which is thro his want of necessary Organs) but it does not thence follow, that he ought to take up with a Conception that implys plain *Contradictions*, which he knows must be wrong, and ought to be rejected: For tho he may not conceive what Sight is (nor is it made his Duty, as in the other Case, to which you parallel it) yet he may be sure 'tis not made up of *Contradictions*. A Man may not understand a thing, and yet understand very well that *Contradictions* about it are false; and this is all the Stress I laid upon this Instance. So that this is no Argument against objecting *Contradictions* to some Mens Notions of the Divine Nature; since in no Case whatever are the blindest Creatures oblig'd to believe direct *Contradictions*, nor wou'd they become no *Contradictions*, if they shou'd believe 'em erroneously.

To what purpose then was that faint Triumph, p. 3. *I will join Issue with him upon it, if he can find Words proper to express the Nature of Sight to a Man born blind, and will give him leave to infer Contradictions from such Words, according as he understands 'em; then I will undertake to solve all the Contradictions in the Terms, by which we express the Holy Trinity*. To explain it so as to enable him to form a clear Idea of it in his Imagination, I neither undertook, nor is it his Duty to have such an Idea, much less to take up with any that are false. But still I say, that a true Explication of the Operation of Sight will never lead him to infer *Contradictions*. If he imagine any in it, which is a certain *Contradiction* (in other Cases) he



as certainly does not rightly take in the true Explication of *this*, and ought to conclude he is in an Error, and to set himself against it; and must either bring his Thoughts to a Consistency, or explicitly believe nothing in the Matter: for no Man, pretend what he will, does believe apparent Contradictions to be none, or (which is the same) to be possibly true; he must, at least, suspend his Assent.

And yet, I believe, as to matter of Fact, that many such blind Persons, tho they have no distinct Idea of Sight, are very far from entertaining Contradictions about it; at least they wou'd be so, if they had understanding Instructors that did not err, as is suppos'd in your Case; where God is reputed the Teacher of *your Notions* of the H. Trinity, who will hardly be thought to leave any Doctrine upon us, to be believ'd under the unavoidable Notion of a Contradiction.

Therefore if there were no Difference between the two Cases you think to be so like, *viz.* of a blind Man's conceiving such a thing as *Sight*, and your Conception of the Trinity; yet there is no reason from thence for taking up with Contradictions in the latter, since 'tis not requisite nor fit to do so in the former.

Besides, who can easily believe such a Case to be really true in the Christian Dispensation, *viz.* That the All-wise and Good God shou'd impose upon a Generation of Men, *born blind*, a long *Creed*, of the nature of *Light*, and *Refractions*, and *Colors*, or a *System of Opticks*; of which they cou'd have no manner of Conception, nor make any Use, only it might set 'em together by the Ears in ignorant Contention? Or that ever he wou'd be pleas'd with such of themselves, as shou'd presume to be paraphrasing on *Light* and *Colors*, &c. in their own *novel devis'd Terms*, which they think more proper and clear, and say, are equivalent to *his* (but being wholly ignorant of the Subject, cannot know what Terms are more or less proper) nay to anathematize and persecute all that assent not thereto? Verily, you insinuate no Honor to your Cause by such an untoward Representation! You own your self blind, and yet you force your Neighbors to take you for their Guide: Therefore, I conclude, Man is not so un-

capable of God's Revelations, as a blind Man of knowing and using the Sun's Light; and I'll suppose you pretend greater Incapacity in Men, and less Benefit from Revelation thereupon, than is true or fit, merely to cover your own Errors, and feign your self blind, that you may be excus'd in holding Contradictions. Tho Blindness it self, as I have shewn, does not constrain us to take that for no Contradiction in one Nature, which is evidently and truly so in another, as you pretend.

After this Absurdity of yours had been expos'd as ridiculous, you wou'd fain hook me into your Company to take share, calling Spectators, *p. 4.* to see me confessing what I had ridicul'd. But why so? Did I say a Contradiction may sometimes be no Contradiction? No. I had granted, say you, there may be something attributed to one Nature, where there is nothing inconsistent or contradictory to it; while, if attributed to another, it might meet with something inconsistent; whence a Contradiction will arise in the one, and not in the other: And so I say still; only I added what you omit, that one of the two Terms of a Contradiction is not the Contradiction, but both together are, and are so in any Nature. And now let as many as you will see, if I say what you had said. Is this all one, to say that a Contradiction (which is two inconsistent Propositions) is sometimes no Contradiction, which is what You said; and that one of the Propositions alone is no Contradiction, which is what I said? Do I, that say Dependence and Derivation of Being is no Contradiction, when said of a Creature, where is nothing repugnant, say the same as he, that says such Dependence and Derivation may be no Contradiction, when said of the Independent, Self-existent God, and First Cause, where the other repugnant Term is found? As mutual Blows make the Fight, so two repugnant Terms make the Contradiction; and this I say still, on sure Grounds, is always absurd, say it of what Nature you well.

Well, but if I did not say what you said (because you are resolv'd we shall agree) you say you meant the same as I say: That *this is all you contend for*, and you desire no more. But this is not all you contended for, you said more, in saying, a Contradiction in one Nature may be none in another: nay,

you meant more, if Words can shew your meaning, by your Instance of going two Yards as soon as one; i. e. to go but one Yard, and yet more than one at once. This is your Resemblance, how a Contradiction in one Case may be none in another; that is, two contradictory Propositions may become not contradictory, as if the Verity of Propositions cou'd be chang'd. Nay, I must add, that this is not all you desire, for your Argument needs more to defend it against the Unitarians.

You know they don't deny that some things may be Contradictions, if affirm'd of Men, which are none when said of God; as to be Eternal, or Infinite, is not, with them, a Contradiction when said of God, because 'twere so if said of Man. You were not so weak to argue for what they always asserted; contrariwise, you did suppose the Socinian to charge you with holding two opposite repugnant Propositions, viz. That God is Unoriginate, and yet a deriv'd Nature, is the first Cause, and yet has a Father and a Cause (as the Greek Fathers express it of the Son) that he is but one He, and yet three He's, &c. Now that such sort of Contradictions, if real, can ever be true, you affirm'd, but I never said; and therefore pray don't call me any more to be your Voucher in such a Case; for you certainly intended more than I said or you pretend: and 'tis incumbent on you, either to shew that these are no Contradictions which they object for such, or that they are not chargeable on your Faith; or if they be real Contradictions, that cleave fast to you, yet there is no Absurdity in them, because Contradictions (i. e. two opposite Propositions) may sometimes be none, or not opposite; and that to be, and not be, may sometimes be the same. And then you'll do more towards the reconciling the Gallican and English Churches, than if their two Synods had sat at the same time, or than is done by the Author of the Regale, &c. Transubstantiation will then be a credible Mystery!

And now since I said nothing that has any Likeness to what I expos'd in yours, you need not pretend to wonder, How I can deny, that what is a Contradiction in one Nature, may yet be none in another. I shou'd wonder more, if I did not deny such an Absurdity.

Your other Instance, which you complain

was not taken notice of, viz. That 'tis no Contradiction for all things to be present with God, tho it be a Contradiction to Men that the past or future things shou'd be present, is to the same purpose as the rest: for in one sense 'tis no Contradiction to either, i. e. for a past thing to be objectively present in the Idea, and so it may be with Man; and in another sense 'tis a Contradiction in both, i. e. to behold that as actually doing now which is past; for so God himself does not behold the original Chaos, as now actually existing void of Form, nor does he judg Adam and Eve to be now in their first Innocency. I doubt some are fond of making abundance of needless Contradictions, on purpose to keep some darling Absurdities of their own in countenance. But tho I am not so vain as to pretend to reconcile all Difficultys, or to say which side is wrong, much less to fathom the boundless Perfections of my glorious Creator; yet I think it is no Arrogance to say, that I am sure both sides of a Problem, or real Contradiction, cannot be true, about any Object: or if they may be both true, and a Contradiction in one Case be none in another, why will you not have a little Charity, and allow that the Unitarians and you don't contradict each other? But tho, in some Cases, 'twou'd be a Contradiction to affirm and deny the same thing; yet of the Divine Nature to do thus, may possibly be none; and-so we are good Friends.

Your next Refuge is, That the Nature of God being incomprehensible, we must not object Contradictions in it, from comparing it with our own, because we understand not his Nature, p. 4. To this I said, it might have some fair Pretence, if we had no Knowledg at all about it; but that we have so much Knowledg, tho partial, as warrants us to deny what is contradictory to it: hence we justly deny many things for being incompatible to the Divine Attributes, to his Spirituality, Goodness, &c. And why may we not as well discern what is contradictory to the Divine Unity, which is as manifest as the others? You reply, That the Attributes and Nature are different; and this is a Dispute not about God's Attributes, but his Nature, of which we are totally ignorant; that 'tis utter Darkness to us, &c.



I might answer you, That *Essential Attributes*, or *Perfections*, are the *very Essence* under so many various inadequate Conceptions; that God is not compounded of *Essence* and *Perfections*, as of different things, but that his very Nature is *Goodness*, *Power*, *Wisdom*, &c. But I will not obscure my Argument, by entering on *metaphysical Nicetys*. I have enough to say without this: for supposing what you crave, there may be good ground to object Contradictions in this Case; for, 1. The Divine *Unity* is one of his Attributes by consent of all, and so may be argu'd about, and Contradictions may be discern'd and objected here as well as in other Attributes. And, 2. Were it otherwise, yet may Contradictions safely be discern'd and started about the Divine Nature, on these Accounts.

1. 'Tis sufficient for this, if I but know what God *is not* in any respect: All allow one way of knowing God is *per viam Negationis*, by denying of his Nature every thing that argues Imperfection. Now if I do but know what God certainly *is not*, I may then object against any thing that, in contradiction thereto, does affirm him to be what I know he is not. Thus if I know that *Derivation of Being* from any other Cause, is what cannot belong to the first supreme Nature, I may justly object Contradiction to those who shall affirm this unoriginate Nature to have a Cause. If I know his Nature can be but one, I object soberly against them that shall say, there are many supreme Divine Natures. I will object against all Imperfection, as a Contradiction to that ever glorious *Jehovah*: and I must know, in some Instances, what is Imperfection, else I shall not know but God may be *mutable* and *mortal* in his Nature, if I cannot know that these are Imperfections.

2. If I know but any Property or Perfection of his Nature, I may know that to be a Contradiction to his Nature, which denies that Perfection or Property. If I know he is a *necessary eternal Being*, I know well that he is of a Nature that *cannot die*. If I know from Reason or Scripture that he is *all-knowing*, I know 'tis a Contradiction to say of him, who *is that Nature*, that he is ignorant of any one thing. Nay,

3. If I knew neither what he *is not*, nor what any Perfection of his Nature *is*; yet

if I knew but what is a Contradiction in the Nature of the thing, and to it self, I may safely say, 'tis a Contradiction when apply'd to God, because 'tis so in it self. Thus *to be* and *not be* at once, *to be* but *one single Person*, and yet 3 such Persons, being repugnant, may safely be objected for a Contradiction, without any regard to the Nature 'tis apply'd to, because of the mutual repugnancy of the two Propositions, which always destroy one another, and cannot be said of the same thing. So that I don't, in this Case, object a Contradiction in God, from a Supposition that his Nature is resembled by mine, but from the bare Nature of a Contradiction. I may doubt whether God be a pure Spirit, or be only a gross Body; whether my Soul be material or immaterial: but leaving this still in doubt, I am sure 'tis not both *material and immaterial*. And if any one shall say, There are both *many Gods*, and *but one such God* in Nature; that once he was not in being, but yet eternally was and is to come; I hope, in these Cases (like to which Contradictions the *Socinians* pretend) one needs not stay till he knows perfectly what the Nature of God is, before he pronounces 'em to be Contradictions. And therefore 'twas not rightly said of you, *Dial. 1. p. 7. That no Contradiction can be charg'd in any Nature we don't understand*, especially when your self had granted to the *Socinian*, That it is a Contradiction to say, *Three Persons* (in God) *are but one Person*; which, I represented to you, was what the *Socinians* charg'd your Scheme with: and therefore you were bound (but wou'd not attempt it) to shew, that this Contradiction is not chargeable upon you; instead of which you cry, a Contradiction in Man may be no Contradiction in God, when 'twas granted 'em, that this were a Contradiction even in God.

Having made it appear, that our Ignorance of the incomprehensible God, does not render us wholly incapable of discovering certain Contradictions in Mens Notions of him, I may conclude you have not taken an effectual Course to convince the *Unitarians*, by saying they must not argue from Contradictions: So that the Matter rests as at the end of the *Remarks*, viz. That it will be expected you shall shew that those and the like Difficultys, objected by them,

them, are either not Contradictions, or not truly charg'd on your Faith of a Trinity in God. If you go on to appear so willing to allow 'em those two Points, I dare say you'll gain no Ground.

Besides, let me add these Remarks :

1. That you have laid a fair Foundation for *Scepticism* : for nothing can be said of God, tho' most absurd, which on your Principles can be confuted ; because not knowing his Nature, we must not say any thing is a Contradiction to it. Nay, since you say we know not the *Nature of Man* (perhaps he may be three Persons and one Man) nor of *Trees*, or a *Pile of Grass*, we cannot then urge Contradictions about them, and so cannot argue about the Nature of any thing ; since all Arguments tend to shew a Contradiction in what we argue against, and so we can prove and be certain of nothing.

Nay, we cannot confute *Transubstantiation*, for we know not the *Nature of Bread and Flesh* (for Sense cannot reach that) and so may not object Contradictions in the Case.

Nay, you can't confute a *Socinian* this way ; for you can't tell whether a Denyal of a Trinity be not consistent with a Trinity, according to you, because this is about the *Nature of God* : and not understanding that, we must not object Contradictions here. How know you that God is not *three Essences* and *one Person* ? The Scripture says not expressly either this or the contrary.

2. You can never justify any long *Creeds* or *Explications* of the Trinity, &c. in other Words than Scriptural : for how shall Men believe your Pretences of Humility, that you can't comprehend God, when at the same time you are for explaining his Nature in unintelligible Terms, *novel*, and more obscure than the Scripture ? If you don't know the Divine Nature, then be silent about it. How dare you say this or that is equivalent to the Scripture-Terms, or *more proper*, when that is to be judg'd of by the Nature of the (unknown) Subject ? But you are for explaining the Text, and urging that it must have *this and that* sense ; sometimes it must be *figurative*, and sometimes *literal* ; and are for scriving Reason as long as you can hold it, and then run to Mystery, when Reason and scholastick Wit are spent ; and tell your Adversary, he must

not argue about the incomprehensible God ; as if you meant, that you may reason, but only 'tis not fit for a *Socinian's* Reason to meddle ; it must be, because their Reason is of a lesser Size.

Nay, is it any great Sign of *Humility of Reason*, to be so confident of your *Deductions*, as to oppress or anathematize such as testify their Dissent from them, tho' they assent to the Text whence you pretend to infer 'em ? And how know you whether their Sense and Inferences or yours be truest, since the Terms you say are all but *Allusions*, and that about a Nature you know nothing of ? Of all Men such may seem the proudest Exalters of human Reason in matters of Faith, even while they decry and reproach it in their more peaceable Adversarys.

3. You cou'd not confute the Pagan Notions of the Divine Nature your way : supposing they held many Gods, or that there is but one Divine Nature, and all the thousands of particular Gods but a *multitude of Persons* in that one Nature (as you suppose many Men in but one human Nature) you cou'd not confute 'em by the Light of Reason at least, because you allow not Contradictions to be an Argument here.

For the Honor of Christianity, I beseech you, never insist on it, that to be a *Christian* is to believe, that a *Contradiction* may sometimes be none at all, and that this is the only way to persuade a Man to be such. I thank God I am convinc'd without it.

I shall do you no Injury if I pass by your wonderful Proofs for the Memory's being another Faculty from that by which we understand, *p. 5. viz.* That the Understanding is only conversant about what is present before it : as if we cou'd not understand any thing that is past, and knew not formerly ; or as if the Idea of what is past may not become present to the Understanding, which yet in the next Line you own. You ask, *If the Understanding forgets ?* I answer, As much as the Memory. But I have shew'd, that three Facultys in one Mind is no parallel for your Trinity. 'Tis neither a Mystery, nor will it resemble (what the *Unitarians* object to you) how three Persons can be but one Person ; unless instead of three Facultys making but one Soul, you had shown that three Facultys make but one Faculty,

or



or three Minds, but one Mind. Nay, you are so tenacious, that whether there be really three Facultys in the Soul or not, you say it does as well for you if it be *but thought so*. Right or wrong, 'tis all one to you. You will hold to the Conclusion, let what will become of the Premises. This is true Courage!

You find fault, that I will argue strictly from the word Person, as 'tis us'd among Men; when I only shew it does not answer the Parallel in that Point (of three being but one in the same Sense) for which you bring it. And since you use the word Persons for explaining better the Scripture-Language, you must suppose it to be more proper and less ambiguous; and till you give another Sense, I must understand it after the known use of it. You add, pag. 6. *If he wou'd apply the word Father so, and the words Repent and Grieve, that are said of God, what Work wou'd he make? &c.* As to the first Term, I see nothing absurd in it. For the other Terms of Repent, &c. the nature of the Subject bids me give 'em a figurative Sense, and I shou'd not dare to use 'em of God, if the Scripture had not done it, which is not your Case; much less wou'd I put 'em into my *explicatory Creeds*. But if at the same time the *Athanasians* wou'd publicly declare, they no more believe three Persons to be in God, than that God can repent or grieve properly; and wou'd give us another fair and open Sense of the Terms, as of the other, that may comport with the Scripture-Account of God, of his Son J. C. and his H. Spirit, and with the rest of their Scheme, then you might have some Pretence for talking thus. But if you assign to the Sacred Three all the various Parts and Distinctions of Persons in a proper Sense, and for that reason do give 'em these Characters: How can considering Men think, you don't design by it, to give 'em an Idea of three proper Persons in one eternal He? And you your self deny the Expressions are figurative, p. 25. *Dial.* I. speaking of such Texts as are alledg'd for a Trinity of Persons.

You are mistaken, in saying, I raise Difficultys how a begotten Being can be God, from gross Conceptions of begetting after the manner of Men, pag. 6. I never had a Thought of more than of a Being deriv'd from another, which I think is the allow'd Sense of Begotten, as

apply'd to the Lord Jesus, who receives his Nature dependently on the Father, says Dr. Whitby on John 14. 28. speaking also the Sense of the antient Fathers: So that the Difficulty is no other, than how a deriv'd dependent Being can be God? which the Unitarians insist on much.

You having illustrated the Coeternity of the Son with the Father by this, that the Light is as old as the Sun, tho the Effect of it; I reply'd, That the Light is really the Sun it self. Upon which you set up a hideous Cry, as if I were bringing the whole Sun upon your Head, and fetching it out of the Firmament; even all that huge Sun, that is so many times bigger than the whole Earth: For, say you, By which we see the very Sun, so many times bigger than the whole Earth, can creep thro a Cranny, and be all of it in this Room, and in a thousand other Places at once: This will help Transubstantiation. Again, If the Light be the Star, then the very Star strikes on the Eye; and then you crow merrily. Let him consider on whose side the poor Philosophy and shallow Reasoning lies. It seems, you imagine, the Sun is not made of Parts; and that if the Sun shines into a Room, it must quit the Firmament, and must come down, all or none. I can't breathe in the Air, I warrant you, without being so unmerciful as to sup it all up; nor say, I stand on the Earth, unless I cover it all over, from East to West. You cannot believe any subtile Streams, or Effluvia of Light, that are a part of that huge luminous Mass, which penetrate small Pores of Bodys. I did not say every Stream of Light was the whole Sun, or that the Parts that are above are beneath. But I fancy you hop'd to find an Instance from me, how a Contradiction in one Case may be none in another: the whole huge Sun in a little Cranny! Ah this subtile Socinian! as you call me. Thus you deride me to your Cost, as *Lactantius* did the *Antipodes*, for going with their Heels upmost.

I heartily wish, Sir, you wou'd entertain the Coffee Houses for one Year with a Course of your Philosophy, I dare promise you many Admirers; and when that has prevail'd, no doubt but your Divinity will go off.

All the Answer you give to the Objection against three Persons in God, from his being spoken of singularly, as I, Thou, He; is

That

the first of *Genesis*, &c. God is spoken plurally; for instead of *God created*, you say, *Dial. 2.* 'tis *Gods* he created: That three Persons are mention'd, the *Father*, *Word* (because God spake, and Speech contains Words) and *Spirit*, and *these Gods made*, &c. So that if Plurality be express'd, as you say well, 'tis a *Plurality of Gods*; if the Singular be *God*, the Plural is certainly *Gods*. Pray stick to that. 'Tis an obvious Reply to this, that 'tis an usual *Hebraism* to put the *Plural* for the *Singular*; and so Princes and others say *We*, when 'tis but *one*. You say indeed, that, in the Royal Language, *We* notes the King and *his Council*; as if *Our Royal Pleasure*, and *We command*, did relate to any but himself. *Dial. 5.* But to silence you once for all in this matter: Know that this Plural Term *Gods*, *Elohim*, is said of one of the Persons alone; *Psal. 45. 7.* *Thy Throne, O Gods, is for ever and ever*: And, *O Gods, thy Gods have anointed thee*, which the Apostle applies to Christ, *Heb. 1. 9.* Now unless the *Son* have another Trinity in him, the *Plural Word* can't intend three Persons, but one, only it is more majestic.

But what must we say to this, that in the New Testament (the proper Place for this Article) there is not so much as one such Expression, but always *He* in the Singular? It had been meet to shew where many Persons ever use the diminutive Language *I*

and *Me*; which you aim at, in telling us, That 'tis said of a King, *He march'd*, &c. when it means *all his Army*: but tho it supposes all the Army, it does express the King alone, and his Authority, and therefore is Singular; for if three Princes together have the Command, it would no longer be, *He march'd*, but *They*, which shews you are out: So that the Objection (with the greatest part of the Remarks) lies on your Hands still.

As for your Comments on other Texts, they are Arrows shot at no Mark, till you state your Notion, whether *three infinite Minds*, or but *one*. Your Expositions are precarious, or go no higher than *Arianism*, or are obviated oft in the *Socinian Comments*; and in answering *their Texts* you are as modest (on *John 17. 3.* *1 Cor. 8. 5.*) as if you said nothing. Pray, Sir, tell us whereabouts your Answer is to the Text, of *that Day knows my Father only*, which some cannot find among your answer'd Texts; and yet it was in that *little Book*, which is all that you venture to attack, and no Text is more urg'd by the *Unitarians*. Pardon this Freedom, Sir, in pursuance of your *Desire to hear from me again*; who, I assure you, am acted herein by no Passion, except it be a passionate Desire of seeing our H. Christian Religion rescu'd from the Burden of Contradictions.

F I N I S.



